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Abstract
Objective: To know what hospital managers and safety leaders in Ibero-American countries are
doing to respond effectively to the occurrence of adverse events (AEs) with serious consequences
for patients.
Design: Cross-sectional international study.
Setting: Public and private hospitals in Ibero-American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Peru, Portugal and Spain).
Participants: A convenience sample of hospital managers and safety leaders from eight Ibero-
American countries. A minimum of 25 managers/leaders from each country were surveyed.
Interventions: A selection of 37 actions for the effective management of AEs was explored. These
were related to the safety culture, existence of a crisis plan, communication and transparency
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Main Outcome Measure: Degree of implementation of the actions studied.
Results: A total of 190 managers/leaders from 126 (66.3%) public hospitals and 64 (33.7%)
private hospitals participated. Reporting systems, in-depth analysis of incidents and non-punitive
approaches were the most implemented interventions, while patient information and care for
second victims after an AE were the least frequent interventions.
Conclusions: The majority of these hospitals have not protocolized how to act after an AE. For
this reason, it is urgent to develop and apply a strategic action plan to respond to this imperative
safety challenge. This is the first study to identify areas of work and future research questions in
Ibero-American countries.
Key words: patient safety, adverse event, open disclosure, second victims, hospital
Introduction
System failures and human errors occur in all health systems and at
all levels of care [1, 2]. Reducing their numbers and their social and
economic impacts are some of the challenges faced by the manage-
ment teams of healthcare institutions [3]. Results are better when
managers are involved in the achievement of safety objectives [4].
Resilience ability
Improving the reliability of professionals, procedures and equipment
is one of the objectives of actions to enhance patient safety. Efforts to
achieve the correct implementation of safe practices are essential, but
they are insufficient. For this reason, we have sought, firstly, to learn
from failures and errors, thanks to the analysis of reported safety
incidents. Secondly, to carry out an adequate management of the risks
inherent to health intervention involving both events those that cause
harm to patients (AEs), and those that have been on the verge of
causing it (quasi-errors) [5]. However, these safety policies cannot
succeed in environments where there is a fear of talking about one’s
own mistakes.
Aftermatch of safety events
In these environments, faults and errors are hidden and concealed,
and consequently, patient safety is put at risk. It is more difficult
for patients suffering from AEs to receive information about what
happened and for their right to fair compensation to be respected.
On the other hand, professionals involved in safety incidents suffered
by patients (and their families) often find it difficult to discuss what
happened with their colleagues and middle-managers, question their
own professional capacity and ultimately make wrong decisions more
easily [6].
Managers role
Since no hospital escapes from the occurrence of safety incidents, it
seems reasonable to be prepared to act after an incident, particularly
in the most serious cases. The role of managers is crucial in putting in
place actions to ensure an adequate response when a severe AE occurs
[7]. Different national agencies and institutions and international
agencies have developed guidelines on the approach to severe AEs
in order to provide guidance and support to health organizations
[8–13]. However, the availability of these tools does not imply their
effective implementation and operation.
In this study, hospital managers and safety leaders from Ibero-
American countries described what they were doing to respond
effectively after the occurrence of an AE with severe consequences
for patients.
Methods
A cross-sectional, multicentre, observational study was conducted in
a non-random selection of public and private hospitals in Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Portugal and Spain.
A severe AE was defined [14] as an unexpected incident that
causes (or is a risk for causing) the death of the patient or a serious
physical or psychological injury (loss of limb or function), which
requires a surgical reintervention or a new invasive treatment or that
unnecessarily prolongs the patient’s stay in the hospital.
The Research Commission of the Department of Health of
Alicante-Sant Joan considered this study, concluding that the object of
the study and the methodology applied did not require an adequacy
assessment.
Participants
Medical doctors, nurses and healthcare managers who were perform-
ing as senior management representatives (CEO, head of medical or
nursing board), head of quality and patient-safety departments, or
leaders of hospital safety committees were invited to respond.
The appropriate sample size to estimate the total score mean value
for each dimension with a maximum tolerable error margin of 0.17
points and a 95% confidence level was determined in 200 subjects.
This involved inviting a minimum of 25 managers per country.
Each country sought to respect the proportion of hospitals in
the public and private systems. We intentionally sought to include
hospitals of different sizes, considering three categories: less than 300
beds, between 300 and 500 beds, and more than 500 beds. Up to
four reminders were made to complete the sample. There was no
compensation for this voluntary, anonymous participation.
Materials
Participants answered a survey of 37 items. This survey was grouped
into five dimensions (safety culture, crisis plan, open disclosure,
support for second victim and public communication). Moreover, it
explored safety culture and institutional policy, patient care, proac-
tive attitude to avoid the recurrence of AEs, support to the profes-
sional and care team, activation of resources to give an adequate
response, communication of what happened to the patient or his/her
family, detailed analysis of the incident, and protection of the rep-
utation of professionals and institutions. This survey was based on
the one used by Mira et al. [15]. Each item asked about the degree
of implementation of certain interventions that have been identified
in the literature as appropriate. A Likert-type response scale of five
levels (from 1 to 5) was used to assess the level of implementation of
each intervention: “Does not exist”, “Scarce”, “Medium”, “High”
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was assessed with four or more points and not implanted with two
points or less. The score for each dimension was calculated as the sum
of the scores for each of the items in that dimension. The percentage
that this score supposed on the maximum score in each dimension
was calculated to allow comparisons between dimensions in the
level of achievement reached. Four sociodemographic variables were
also included: professional profile, years in the position, size of the
hospital and the health sector in which it worked. In the elaboration
of the items, a uniform cultural adaptation was sought, eliminating
any expression that could lead to misinterpretations. We reviewed
the wording of the questions, one by one, and their possible semantic
implications in each of the countries participating in the study. Sixteen
professionals (five Spanish, five Chilean, five Argentinean and one
Peruvian) participated in this pilot comprehension test. They assessed
the degree of comprehension of each question on a Likert scale of
5 points and, depending on the case, specified alternative wording.
They were also asked if they identified any other intervention that
should be included in the questionnaire. In the case of Brazil and
Portugal, the translation–retranslation procedure was applied to
ensure the equivalence of the Spanish and Portuguese versions.
Field study
Each country had a reference researcher who coordinated the study
schedule with the other researchers. This researcher was responsi-
ble for issuing invitations to respond to participants and sending
reminder messages to encourage response. A website was available
for replying (http://calite-revista.umh.es/delphis/) between July 2018
and October 2019. During the study, an e-mail address was available
to resolve the incidents and doubts of the participants.
Statistical analysis
Frequencies and descriptive statistics were calculated for each item
and dimension. The implementation percentage of each dimension
was obtained from the global direct average score and the maximum
possible score in each dimension according to the number of items
that integrated it. Non-parametric tests for independent samples were
used to identify possible differences in the degree of implementation
of the interventions, specifically the U-Mann–Whitney test was used
for comparisons by continent and Kruskal–Wallis H-test for compar-
isons by country and hospital size. Responses were dichotomized by
grouping values below and above 3 to identify interventions with a
lower and higher degree of implementation, respectively.
Results
A total of 190 managers and patient-safety leaders from the eight
countries responded. Four countries had less than 25 participants:
Peru, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. A total number of 126 (66.3%)
participants belonged to public hospitals and 102 (53.7%) to hospi-
tals with 300 or more beds (Table 1).
The set of interventions grouped around building a proactive
safety culture (52.3 out of 80, 65.4% over the maximum score
that could be obtained (MS)) or having a plan on what to do after
a severe AE (13.3 out of 20, 66.4% MS) obtained higher scores
compared to the set of interventions grouped in dimensions related
to the protocol of what information and care the patient who has
been a victim of a severe AE should receive (29.2 out of 50, 58.5%
MS), how to carry out care for the professionals involved in these
AEs (second victims) (10.4 out of 20, 51.9% MS) and how to carry
out institutional communication after a severe AE (7.9 out of 15,
52.7% MS). Results in each dimension and in each country are
Table 1 Description of the sample



















Less than 2 years 33 17.4
Between 2 and 5 years 57 30.0
More than 5 years 100 52.6
Hospital size
Less than 300 beds 88 46.3
Between 300 and 500 beds 56 29.5
More than 500 beds 46 24.2
presented in Supplementary Table S1). Supplementary Tables S2–S6
show the detail of response frequencies in each item for each of the
five dimensions.
American vs. Iberian countries
The degree of implementation of these interventions grouped by
dimensions differed among hospitals grouped by participating coun-
tries (Supplementary Table S1). European countries scored higher in
the dimensions analyzed (Table 2).
Hospital size
The participants from the hospitals with the largest number of beds
reflected a higher level of implementation of the interventions iden-
tified in the guidelines and recommendations with their assessments
(Table 3). However, this effect differed among countries. For example,
while the largest hospitals in Argentina and Mexico scored highest
in the “safety culture” dimension, in Spain and Chile, the highest
scores corresponded to the smallest hospitals (P = 0.001). In the
“Crisis plan” dimension, the largest Mexican hospitals scored the
best (P < 0.001). In the “Open disclosure” dimension, the largest
Argentinean and Mexican hospitals achieved the best scores, while
in Chile and Spain, they were the smallest hospitals (P = 0.046).
In the “support for second victims” dimension, the largest Argen-
tinean and Mexican hospitals again obtained the highest scores,
although in all cases, the implementation of these measures was low
(P = 0.007).
Public vs. private hospitals
No differences in scores were identified between public and private
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Table 2 Questionnaire scores grouped by American vs. Iberian countries
Dimension Continent N Mean SD P-value
Safety culture (maximum score 80) America 127 49.4 13.4 <0.001
Europe 63 58.4 10.7
Crisis plan (maximum score 20) America 127 12.4 4.2 <0.001
Europe 63 15.1 3.3
Open disclosure (maximum score 50) America 127 27.8 10.8 0.003
Europe 63 32.1 8.8
Support for second victims (maximum score 20) America 127 9.6 4.4 <0.001
Europe 63 12.1 4.1
Public communication (maximum score 15) America 127 7.5 3.2 0.013
Europe 63 8.7 3.0
The U Mann–Whitney test was used.
Table 3 Scores based on hospital size
Dimension Number of beds N Mean SD 95% CI P-value
Safety culture (maximum
score 80)
<300 88 49.1 13.2 46.4 51.9 0.001
300–500 56 52.9 13.0 49.5 56.4
>500 46 57.8 12.1 54.2 61.4
Crisis plan (maximum score
20)
<300 88 12.1 4.0 11.3 13.0 0.000
300–500 56 13.4 4.6 12.3 14.6
>500 46 15.3 3.2 14.3 16.2
Open disclosure (maximum
score 50)
<300 88 27.6 10.0 25.5 29.7 0.046
300–500 56 29.4 11.2 26.4 32.4
>500 46 32.2 9.6 29.4 35.1
Support for second victims
(maximum score 20)
<300 88 9.4 4.0 8.6 10.3 0.007
300–500 56 10.6 4.8 9.3 11.9
>500 46 11.9 4.5 10.6 13.3
Public communication
(maximum score 15)
<300 88 7.4 3.0 6.7 8.0 0.52
300–500 56 8.0 3.6 7.1 9.0
>500 46 8.8 3.1 7.9 9.7
The Kruskal-Wallis H test was used.
Implanted interventions
Supplementary Table S7 shows the number of interventions of each
dimension implemented, according to the information provided by
managers and security officers, and the number of those other
interventions that were considered far from being implemented.
The interventions that were considered implemented (scores ≥4)
according to the information provided by the participants were
(Supplementary Table S8): implementation and promotion of inci-
dent reporting systems, fostering a non-punitive culture, and root
cause or equivalent technical analysis carried out when a serious
AE occurs. Conversely, non-implemented interventions (scores ≤2)
included actions to help the professionals most directly involved
in severe AEs who are emotionally affected by these incidents and
having incident information that can be provided by the patient
who has suffered a severe AE. Other actions rarely implemented
were to have a procedure to assign the patient fair compensation
after suffering a serious AE and to have identified what training
the professionals of the centre may need in order to be able to face
(with guarantees) the information on the patients who have suffered
a serious AE.
The most frequently implanted interventions from each coun-
try were to promote a non-punitive culture (hospitals from Chile,
Portugal and Spain), conduct route cause analyses after serious
incidents (hospitals from Argentina, Colombia, Portugal and Spain)
and report systems (hospitals from Portugal and Spain). In contrast,
the interventions that have not been implanted in a majority of
hospitals from each country were as follows: patient can participate
in RCA (hospitals from Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Portugal and
Spain), fair compensation system in case of serious AE (hospitals
from Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru), absence of professional
training to inform the patient after an AE (hospitals from Argentina,
Brazil and Chile), absence of second victim protocols (hospitals from
Argentina and Peru) and safety culture analysis (hospitals from Peru)
(Supplementary Table S9).
Discussion
As far as we know, this is the first study in the region that addresses
the analysis of the safety incidents as part of the quality culture,
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serious AE or how to address the problems of second victims. The
results have highlighted that there is huge room for improvement
regarding second and third victims in these countries.
These results suggest that interventions related to respect for
patients’ rights, support for second victims and those aimed at
preserving the hospital’s reputation following the occurrence of
severe AEs have a low level of implementation. Additionally,
in the Ibero-American region, interventions have been imple-
mented more systematically to encourage the reporting of safety
incidents and the analysis of incidents with the most serious
consequences, in line with international recommendations on patient
safety [16].
Compared to other studies in the region [14], the results follow
a similar trend. While interventions to promote a proactive culture
of safety are more consolidated, those referring to the informational
and emotional care of patients who have suffered a severe AE, to the
emotional needs of the professionals involved in the incidents, or to
the care of the content and channels for disseminating information
about what happened in the institution continue to be underdevel-
oped. The results indicate that European hospitals have a higher
degree of implementation of interventions considered appropriate
to address the challenge of patient safety, with the exception of
interventions grouped under the public communication dimension.
However, differences in hospital size should be considered when
interpreting these findings. It has not been possible to establish a
pattern between American and European hospitals, and depending
on which intervention we analyze, the degree of implementation may
be greater in one country or another, which probably reflects the
diversity of the safety culture of existing hospitals. These findings
also suggest that the main intervention to prevent potential risks is
based on the implementation of reporting systems, although a greater
effort should be made to introduce a productive risk policy in most
hospitals, mainly in a majority of the American hospitals involved in
this study.
These results draw a scenario in which while promoting incident
reporting and in-deep analysis to avoid future occurrences, patients
are not encouraged to be informed so that they have the opportunity
to receive fair compensation after suffering a severe AE. Additionally,
if we consider the results of other studies that have shown that,
at some point in their professional careers, most professionals will
have made a medical error [17–20]. It means that, in most of these
hospitals, this reality is ignored and no action is planned to alleviate
the consequences that failures and errors have on the quality of care,
despite having proposals on how to deal with this phenomenon for
some time [21–23].
These data contrast with those found in other countries that have
made a greater effort to replace the punitive culture after the error.
For example, the number of hospitals that do have support programs
for second victims is notably higher in the USA [24] (74%) and
the Netherlands [6] (30%). However, they tend to coincide with the
results of the study carried out in Spain in which around 70% of
patients who suffered an AE did not receive adequate information
about the incident or to obtain fair compensation. Additionally,
more than 80% of the professionals involved in these incidents did
not receive any type of attention (neither psychological nor legal).
Although in all cases there are opportunities for improvement (in
the 2008 study by White et al. [21], only 30% of managers were
committed to support programs for second victims, and in van
Gerven et al. [6], 12% did not know how to identify the reference
person for the aid programme), in the countries analyzed, the road
ahead is greater.
Probably, for the same reason, it is no coincidence that the
hospitals in this study are located in countries where there are no
no-fault compensation policies. However, sorry laws [25] seem to
contribute to a greater involvement of professionals in safety [26,
27]. This fact probably justifies some of the results obtained and
represents one of the challenges that should probably be addressed as
a priority. In this direction, it is likely that changes will be required not
only at the attitudinal level but also at the legislative level, to break the
current circle between error and guilt, introducing organizational and
legislative changes that favour learning from mistakes and mistakes,
while respecting patients’ rights [28].
Limitations
The scores were obtained from the voluntary response of managers
and safety officers of a non-random selection of hospitals. The
number of participants from Peru was lower than expected, and the
number of participants and the recruitment method did not guarantee
the representativeness of the results for the Ibero-American countries
as a whole. This is a first study that explores what initiatives have
been carried out. There has been no verification of the degree of
implementation of each of the interventions described. Although this
is an exploratory study, it provides a description of the challenges
faced by the health authorities and the top management of hospitals
in these countries in order to transform the culture of safety and
increase patient safety. Based on this approach, new studies can
be proposed on more specific aspects of interest for patient-safety
policies in these countries.
Although the general trend is that larger hospitals have achieved
a wider implementation of the interventions analyzed, the number of
hospitals that have participated in this study in each country should
therefore be interpreted with caution, modulating these results. These
results could overestimate the implementation of the interventions,
since they could have been answered only by those hospital managers
who have already specified actions to be carried out.
Implications
As we know from other studies [29–34], the frequency with which
safety incidents occur in these countries, we now know that the inter-
ventions carried out do not include attending to the emotional and
information needs of patients who have suffered an AE or the atten-
tion to the emotional needs of the first-line professionals involved in
such incidents. It seems advisable that national safety plans in Ibero-
America be revised to include intervention lines and organizational
and legal changes to facilitate normalization of speaking of one’s
own failures and errors as a necessary step to increase patient safety.
The search for those responsible in a punitive environment makes
it difficult to prevent new AEs, because there is a tendency to hide
what is happening. At the same time, it is necessary to advance in the
establishment of a culture of fair compensation for patients who have
suffered a serious AE, compensation that should be accompanied by
greater transparency about safety incidents and measures to avoid
them in the future.
Supplementary material
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